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REVIEWS
JURAL RELATIONS*
In this book Professor Kocourek has set forth, not his
philosophy of law, since he says the book is not concerned with
the nature of law or the sources of law, but his system of Formal
Jurisprudence. "It represents the view that the science of law
is conceptual in all of its elements and operations and that the
basis of this conceptual structure is one of purely objective
facts."
The first characteristic of the book to attract attention is its
terminology. So many are the new terms--mostly from Greek
roots-that one cannot be quite sure whether he is reading a
book in English or in some foreign language, and a glossary of
eighteen pages almost convinces one that the book is written in
a foreign language. Perhaps Professor Kocourek is right when
he suggests that his book may help to make the legal profession
"learned" in fact as well as name, but the reviewer confesses
that a first reading of it is likely to leave the average member
of the legal profession with sort of a feeling of bewilderment.
Such terms as contra-duty, non-duty, capability, conditioning
relations, disability, inability, dominus, servus, frangible relations, infra-jural relations, contraries, sub-contraries, personateness, polarized relations, post-venient relations, reciprocals,
rescindable and abscindable relations, and unitary, relations will
not bother him. But his difficulties will begin with such terms
as: Abnormal concatenation, abnormal intercalation, accrescent
relations, active ligations, adjunction, allophylaxis, anomic relations, autophylaxis, biactive integral conflict, congruent, conjunctive, decrescent, degenerable, ectophylactic, endophylactic,
heteradic, heterogenous, heterologous, heteromeral, heteromorphic, heterotaxic, homadic, homogenous, homologous, homomeral, homomorphic, homotaxi, intercalation, mesonomic, nexal,
regenerable, remedial prolepsis, taxonomy and zygnomic. And
his bewilderment will be complete after reading that "Jural
relations are congruent when the dominus or servus of plural
relations is the same person"; that "the two power relations
(i. e., to perform and not to perform) are conjunctive congruent
relations"; that "in logical conflict of a mesonomic and a zygnomic relation, the mesonomic relation if evolved prevails over
the zygnomic"; and that "the acceptance of an offer of a promise
for a promise is the causal involutive fact of a conjunctive binary
relation." But, after learning that the correct term for the
fact that a creditor may destroy a non-recorded mortgage relation is "abscindable, sanctional, uniactive, integral, conflict* Jural Relations, by Albert Kocourek. xxiii, 482. BobbsMerrill, Indianapolis, 1927.
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ing, conjunctive, plurinary relations," he will be ready to fall
down and give up the ghost. The reviewer does not wonder
that Dean Wigmore expresses the hope, "May the profession
show the courage to master it"! If Mr. Wigmore's own phrase,
"autoptic proference," is still the subject of genial jest, of what
will Mr. Kocourek's phrases be the subject?
If the present reviewer were to criticise Mr. Kocourek's
(1) It
terminology, it would be on three different grounds:
seems to this reviewer that some of his terms are arbitrary;
there is no particular reason why these terms should have been
chosen rather than some other terms. Among such terms may
be named "ligation", "zygnomic", "regenerable", "intercalary",
and perhaps "mesonomic". (2) Some of his terms and processes
are interesting but not useful, as, for example, those found in
Chapter VII and the last part of Chapter XII. (3) Some of his
terms are of doubtful accuracy. This last criticism involves
more than mere terminology, and therefore needs more
elaboration.
Some minor points will first be discussed. It would seem
that "will spade" (p. 102) should read "will promise to spade."
Why is the relation (p. 107) called mesonomic when the law
will constrain by mandamus or by damages? Why should a
breach of the duties of innkeepers, carriers, etc. be called quasi
torts? It would seem to be better to give these duties a place
of their own in the law, as trusts and quasi contracts have. Is
the phrase "investitive facts" better than the phrase "operative
facts"? Is it correct to say that a zygnomic relation cannot be
regenerated when security can be given for an unsecured claim?
The statement (p. 204) that in the offer of a promise for an
act the power of acceptance may be assigned is erroneous. So
also is the statement (p. 204) that there is nothing to assign
in a bi-promissory relation until an actual communicated acceptance; because in such case the promisee may be given the power
to accept in some other way, as by silence or by some other noncommucated act. Promissory conditions may be precedent as
well as casual (p. 207). In the problem (pp. 236-7) are there
as many legal relations as there are sovereignties? It is now
held that "Bonds" (p. 241) are taxable like tangible chattels.
"Default" (p. 284) does not destroy a contractual right, i. e.
discharge a contract, unless the other party elects to treat it as a
discharge (instead of to sue for specific performance etc.),
although it does create a new secondary right-duty relation, and
the same criticism would seem to apply to so-called tort duties.
The reviewer is not yet convinced that in joint debts there are
as many debts as debtors instead of one debt by one legal entity.
The book is tinctured too much with the Austinian ideas of law
and sovereignty with their notions of force (pp. 13, 64, 65, 67,
351) and command.
Professor Kocourek, following the late Professor Hohfeld,
uses the term "rights" in the generic sense (p. 7) and substi-

REVIEWS

tutes the term "claim" for right in the specific sense (pp. 7, 16,
21). The reviewer thinks this a mistake. He thinks the term
"right" should be restricted to its specific meaning, and the term
"capabilities" should be employed for the generic term. The
attempt to use the term "rights" in the generic sense only and
the term "claim" in the specific sense has failed and it will
always fail. It is unnatural and unnecessary. Mr. Kocourek
himself affords all the proof that is needed on this point. Once
in awhile he slips back into the use of "right" in the specific
sense (p. 14), but he never uses the term "rights" in the generic
sense. If "rights" is the correct generic term, (following the
approved method of definition, which first identifies the thing
to be defined with the genus of which it is a species and then
distinguishes it from other species of the genus), he should have
defined a claim as a right, a power as a right, a privilege as a
right, and an immunity as a right, but instead in every case
he correctly defined them as capabilities (pp. 6, 7, 12, 13, 31, 58,
79, 100, 125). If this isn't proof it is certainly an admission
that "rights" is not the correct generic term but that "capabilities" is.
Professor Kocourek's great term is "Jural Relations." This
term, according to him, includes everything legal. Every legal
concept is one end or the other of a jural relation. Perhaps
he is right, but there are some things about which the reviewer
has his doubts. Mr. Kocourek makes no practical distinction
between jural relations and legal relations (p. 75). He calls a
power to make an offer a legal relation, yet he admits (p. 425)
that "a legal relation exists only between 'two persons, neither
more or less,'" and he admits that in this case there is "no
present legal relation" (p. 220). It seems to the reviewer that
here is one legal concept which cannot be included within the
category of jural relations. Mr. Kocourek calls anything a legal
relation which produces legal effects. Events do this. But of
course they are not legal relations. Again, are the domestic
relations and fiduciary relations legal relations? If so, are they
domestic and fiduciary relations because the law has imposed
duties etc., or has the law imposed these duties etc. because they
are domestic and fiduciary relations? It would seem that certain
rights, powers, privileges or immunities may, or may not, be
legal relations, and may, or may not, be caused by legal relations.
Hence, it would seem that Fundamental Jural Concepts would
have been, a better name for Mr. Kocourek's book than the one
he has chosen. In that event it would not have been necessary
for him to invent conceptual persons (pp. 291-303) to solve
the difficulties into which his other assumptions had got him.
If one posits legal relations, of course a power is terminated
by death, but if one posits a power after death (as is sometimes
now true) a legal relation is not required. The reviewer wonders whether in the case of suicide (p. 296) punishment is meted
out on a conceptual person or this is merely a vestige of early
times when inanimate objects were personified.
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Professor Kocourek confines the term privilege to cases where
it is in dominant logical opposition to a right. The reviewer is
not yet ready to accept this result. He agrees with Mr.
Kocourek that personal liberty must be set off against social
control, because law is a scheme of social control which delimits
personal liberty. He agrees also that privilege is personal
liberty. Then is not Mr. Kocourek right in his contention that
privilege is not a part of social control? Logically he seems
right, but in fact he is wrong. This is shown: (1) by the
fact that certain privileges are protected against social control
by the United States Constitution, (2) by the fact that any
privilege is sufficient consideration for a contract and may be
thus surrendered by an individual for social control, (3) by
the fact that as social control increases personal liberty
(privileges) decreases, and (4) by the fact that the same act,
as to sue, may be a privilege if one is honest on reasonable
grounds, because he then has no duty not to sue, but not a
privilege if he is not honest on reasonable grounds because he
does have a duty not to sue. Hence in this respect the reviewer
agrees with the Hohfeldians and not Mr. Kocourek.
However, the reviewer would not leave the impression,
because he has made many criticisms, that the book is not a
fine book. The reviewer may be wrong, he probably is wrong,
in his criticisms and suggestions, and Mr. Kocourek right; but
even if the reviewer is right that fact would not seriously
detract from the value of the book. A book has value if it
only stimulates such thinking as this book does. But there are
many things in the book about which the reviewer has only
unmitigated praise. Among these, mention may be made of the
distinctions between rights, powers, privileges and immunities
and the relation of immunities to rights and of privileges to
powers, the idea of general freedom, the idea of personateness
of corporations, the explanation of jural contraries and subcontraries, the use of the terms polarized and unpolarized relations (identification test) instead of the terms in personam and
in rem, the development of the ideas of affirmative and negative
and conjunctive and disjunctive relations (except for the excessive terminology) and logical and integral conflict, the use
of the terms rescindable and abscindable relations and of nomic
and anomic, the demonstration of the importance of powers and
of their mode of operation, and the explanation of the nature of
remainders and reversions. The book is full of arresting and
challenging statements. Notice, for example the following:
"An act is the legal concept of the result either of a bodily
movement or of a result attributable to its absence ;" "Individual
personateness is conceptual. A human being is an object of a
legal relation"; "Land is space (geometric) and nothing more."
All in all the reviewer is of the opinion that "Jural Relations" is a great work. It is one of the most brilliant and
thought-provoking books written by an American jurist. If it
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has mistakes they are the mistakes of the lonely unaided pioneer,
and they can be corrected. It is a book which should be a part
of the required reading of every law teacher in the AngloAmerican world.
Indiana University School of Law.
HUGH E. WILLIS.

SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
Sir Henry Maine, writing in his Popular Government, has
said that "The Constitution of the United States is a modified
version of the British Constitution, but the British Constitution
which served as its original was that which was in existence
between 1760 and 1787. The modifications introduced were
those, and those only, which were suggested by the new circumstances of the American colonies, now become independent."
This is, in the main, the position advanced and ably defended
by Stevens' Sources of the Constitution of the United States,-the thesis that a predominant majority of the constitutional
principles, practises, and usages which were enunciated by the
Constitution in 1787 was the direct result of our English ancestry. The colonists were largely of English extraction. They had
lived for a relatively long period of time under English colonial
rule and knew little that was not fundamentally of English
origin,-whether it be habits, common law, or government.
That the point of view here put forth by Stevens is not dead is
evidenced by the fact that the book, first published in 1894, has
only within the last few months been reissued by Macmillan and
Company.
The Revolution, contends Stevens, wrought little change in
the fabric of government in the individual colonies. Even in
the national governmental system were preserved many fundamental principles found in the English system, namely, separation of powers, a supreme judiciary, and a central legislature
with broad powers. Stevens notes the strong leanings of the
colonial fathers to Montesquieu's Esprit des Lois, but he hastens
to explain, and rightly, that Montesquieu's well known work
was the result of long observation of the English system in
operation. As for the Bill of Rights, adopted as amendments
to the Constitution of 1787, the author carries forward the same
general line of argument, showing that, with a few enumerated
exceptions, the great guarantees there announced were based on
long-standing English custom or had long been incorporated in
the English common law.
Sources of the Constitution of the United States. By C. Ellis
Stevens. The Macmillan Company, New York. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged, 1894. Reissued, September, 1927.
Pages xx, 313. Price $2.00.

